Things Fall Apart Assessing US-led State-building Efforts in Afghanistan (2001–2021

Abstract

This study examines the failure of the US-led and UN-backed state-building efforts in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021. It examines the assumptions underlying the design of the Afghan state and the challenges encountered in its implementation that eventually led to its demise. The study employs the concept of neotrusteeship, as developed by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, to analyse the specific kind of state-building project undertaken in Afghanistan. Neotrusteeship, following Fearon and Laitin, is understood as a contemporary form of international governance where major powers and international organisations assume significant roles in rebuilding and administering weak or collapsed states. In the context of Afghanistan, the US/UN intervention in 2001 fits appropriately within such a framework. The chapter then delves into the causes behind state failure in Afghanistan, arguing that the centralised model of governance imposed by the Bonn Agreement disregarded Afghanistan's historical power-sharing arrangements and informal structures, leading to incompetence and corruption. The study also highlights the impact of Afghanistan's sectarian composition on the conflict. Finally, the conclusion reiterates the fragility of externally driven state-building projects as witnessed by the spectacular state collapse in Afghanistan. © 2026 selection and editorial matter, Amit Ranjan

individual chapters, the contributors.